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ABSTRACT 
 
Does doing good to society make firms less likely to have financial trouble? This paper looks at 
the benefit of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and examines whether firms’ CSR engagement 
affects their chance of falling into financial distress. After analyzing a broad U.S. database 
spanning 25 years from 1991 to 2015, we find that CSR engagement indeed reduces the likelihood 
of firms falling into financial distress, and the results are statistically robust and economically 
significant. Further, we find the impact of CSR on the likelihood of financial distress is more 
pronounced in economic downturns and for firms with high levels of international involvement. 
Collectively, our result suggests that CSR lowers financial distress risks by improving firm-
stakeholder relationships, which enhances our understanding of the stakeholder view of CSR with 
longitudinal approach and contextual consideration of firms. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last few decades, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been explored extensively by 
both practitioners and researchers as a strategic priority for business entities. Massive corporate 
resources have been invested into CSR related activities, ranging from reducing pollution to 
cutting energy and water consumption levels. According to the Report on U.S. Sustainable, 
Responsible, and Impact Investing Trends (2018), the market size of CSR investment reached a 
historical high of $12 trillion, an increase of 38% from 2016. Socially irresponsible firms, on the 
other hand, were punished by consumers as well as investors. For example, the 2010 Deepwater 
Horizon spill of British Petroleum brought the total costs to around $65 billion up to 2018. 
Recently, Volkswagen lost 20% of its market value overnight due to its emission test cheating 
scandal and Facebook stock dropped roughly 20% over data privacy controversies. Doing good to 
society has become a common practice for business entities.  
 
Does doing good to society benefit the business entities as well? Extensive academic research has 
explored the financial rewards of companies’ CSR engagement. Most of the early studies 
investigated the direct link between CSR activities and financial performance (Feldman, Soyka, 
& Ameer, 1997; Jiao, 2010; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Reynes, 2003; Nelling & Webb, 2009) with 
mixed empirical results. Later research further investigated the channels through which CSR 
influences firm value and provided various explanations (Kim, Park, & Wier, 2012; El Ghoul, 
Guedhami, Kwok, & Mishra, 2011; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013; Lins, Servaes, & Tamayo, 2017; 
Bae, El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, & Zheng, 2018).  
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Despite the stream of publications on CSR, limited research examined how CSR activities affect 
firms’ risk profile (e.g. Jo & Na, 2012; Hsu & Chen, 2015). The lack of attention was mostly 
salient concerning CSR and firms’ financial risk. This omission is important because whether 
firms’ CSR influences financial risk, especially financial distress, provides an alternative channel 
to examine firm value. According to the trade-off theory of capital structure (Kraus & 
Litzenberger, 1973; Scott, 1976; Kim, 1978), financial distress is very costly to the firm. Worrying 
about financial distress constrains firms’ ability to raise capital and take advantage of tax shield 
benefits, thus lowering the total value of the firm. In other words, if more CSR engagement reduces 
firms’ chance of falling into financial distress, then this effect indirectly increases firm 
performance. In addition, investigating the influence of CSR on firms’ chances of falling into 
financial distress has significant economic implications. Firms subject to large costs of financial 
distress could make strategic changes for improvement by increasing CSR investments. In 
particular, investment institutions with relatively small risk tolerance, such as pension funds, could 
focus more on the CSR features of their security products.  
 
To fill this gap in the literature, this study explores the direct impact of CSR on firms’ likelihood 
of falling into costly financial distress. Current literature holds divided views on this question. 
Shareholder expense view argues that CSR is a diversion from maximizing shareholder value and 
therefore suboptimal CSR investments waste financial resources and increase firms’ chances of 
falling into financial distress (Pagano & Volpin, 2005; Cronqvist, Heyman, Nilsson, Svaleryd, & 
Vlachos, 2009; Masulis & Reza, 2015). On the other hand, the stakeholder view gives credit to the 
benefit of contract maintenance by CSR and suggests CSR engagement reduces the likelihood of 
financial distress (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013; Lins et al., 2017; Bae et al., 2018). Similarly, benefits 
of CSR include ease of financing and lower litigation risk (El Ghoul et al. 2011), both of which 
help reduce firms’ probability of falling into costly financial distress. Both shareholder expense 
view and stakeholder view offer valid arguments and empirical tests will reveal which one 
dominates the effect and receives better support from the data. We believe it important to reconcile 
both perspectives and suggest that CSR may exert impact on financial distress differently 
depending on economic conditions and firms’ international market involvement.  
 
Based on a sample of 11,840 U.S. firm-year observations from 1991 to 2015, we find that more 
CSR engagement significantly reduces firms’ chance of falling into financial distress. After 
controlling the potential reverse causality and omitted variable issues, we find the main effect 
unaffected. Therefore, our results suggest that stakeholder view of CSR can better explain the 
impact of CSR on firms’ financial distress when using longitudinal research designs and 
considering contextual evolution of firms in terms of international involvement.  
 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, our study explores a new channel 
through which CSR could affect firm value. By showing strong and consistent evidence on the 
relation between CSR and financial distress outcome, we provide a new piece of evidence 
supporting the positive role played by CSR (El Ghoul et al., 2011; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013; Lins 
et al., 2017; Bae et al., 2018). Second, consistent with prior research on CSR and firm risk 
(McGuire, Sundgren, & Schneeweis, 1988; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Hsu & Chen, 2015), our results 
add value to existing research by showing firms with high CSR score have lower financial risks 
especially during economic downturns and when firms engage with international stakeholders.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Financial Distress 
 
Financial distress and its impact on firm value were introduced by Modigliani and Miller (1958, 
1963), where they argue that corporate value is irrelevant to the capital structure or indebtedness 
in a perfect capital market. However, with the presence of tax advantage of debt and bankruptcy 
cost, capital structure significantly affects firm value in the imperfect market. The tradeoff theory 
(Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973; Scott, 1976; Kim, 1978) argues that firms’ optimal debt ratio is 
reached by trading off between tax shield benefits and cost of financial distress. This theory 
establishes the link between financial distress and firm value: costly financial distress lowers 
firms’ debt capacity to take advantage of the benefits of tax shield, thus reducing total firm value. 
 
Financial distress occurs when a company cannot meet its financial obligations to its credits. Based 
on the tradeoff theory, it is crucial for companies to develop operational strategies to either lower 
the financial distress costs or, as investigated by this paper, lower the probability of falling into 
costly financial distress. As suggested by the existing literature, financial distress could impose 
dead-weight costs on firms, both directly (including legal, administrative, and advisory fees 
associated with bankruptcy) and indirectly (decline in business operation, lower morale in work 
force, etc.). Although the direct cost of financial distress might be negligible, ranging from 1% to 
5% of total firm value (Warner, 1977; Weiss, 1990; Lubben, 2000), the indirect cost has been 
identified to be substantial. Altman (1984) documents indirect cost of financial distress to be 11% 
to 17% of firm value based on the decline in sales of bankruptcy companies. Opler and Titman 
(1994) also observe substantial loss in market share and market value of equity for highly 
leveraged firms. In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) specify that distressed firms could be 
forced into selling assets at huge discounts rather than fair market value. Financial distress could 
also lead to undesired higher cost of financing, losses of key customers, suppliers, and trained 
workforce, among others. Given the catastrophic effect of financial distress, companies always 
put strategic priorities on reducing the likelihood of financial stress (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2005). 
Businesses are finding that being socially responsible can be great for the bottom line, as well as 
good for employee morale. It would be great if the same good behavior also reduced a firm’s 
chance of falling into financial distress.  
 
Shareholder Expense View of CSR 
 
According to the definition proposed by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
in “Corporate Social Responsibility: Meeting Changing Expectations”, CSR is the continuing 
commitment of a business to behave ethically and contribute to sustainable economic 
development, working with employees, their families, the local community and society at large to 
improve their quality of life. Socially responsible firms have higher engagement in CSR 
investments and devote more corporate resources into CSR activities than firms that are not 
responsible.  
 
Shareholder expense view suggests that firms invest in nonproductive CSR activities to benefit 
stakeholders but at the expense of shareholders. For example, an opportunistic manager 
voluntarily pursuing stringent pollution standards can boost the manager’s reputation as a socially 
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responsible citizen. However, such investments are not necessary and will harm the 
competitiveness of the firm (Deng, Kang, & Low, 2013). These CSR engagements do not 
financially benefit the firms, rather they waste precious resources. According to Ullmann (1985) 
and Aupperle, Carroll, and Hatfield (1985), derailed from the traditional financial management 
goal of maximizing shareholder value, CSR investments waste precious financial resources, which 
could have been invested into profitable projects or solved debt constraint problems. The 
shareholder perspective suggests firms with higher CSR are financially disadvantaged compared 
to others, which could potentially increase financial risks. If an exogenous shock takes place and 
exposes firms into potential shortage of debt payment, firms with high CSR engagement may have 
even less financial flexibility to make the payment, thus exposing itself to financial distress. Many 
empirical studies support the shareholder expense view. Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014) show 
that increase in CSR ratings is achieved at the direct expense of firm value, including negative 
stock returns and declines in return on assets. Bhandari and Javakhadze (2017) show that CSR 
distorts firm-level capital allocation efficiency and the distortion is also reflected in firm 
performance. Accordingly, we hypothesize a positive relationship between a firm’s CSR and 
likelihood of falling into financial distress. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: ceteris paribus, CSR increases firms’ probability of falling into financial distress. 
 
Stakeholder View of CSR 
 
The shareholder expenses view has been challenged in subsequent research of stakeholder theory. 
According to contract theory (Coase, 1937), a firm is a nexus of contracts between shareholders 
and stakeholders (including suppliers, customers, investors, employees, among others). CSR 
represents an investment in intangible assets such as firm reputation and human capital with an 
expectation for return with strengthened relationships with stakeholders. Based on the stakeholder 
view (Jones, 1995; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984), companies should consider the 
interests of a broader group of stakeholders and align the interests between stakeholder and 
shareholders. Stakeholder view implies that CSR engagements are important in obtaining 
necessary resources and support from stakeholders (Jones, 1995). A growing literature has 
supported the benefits of CSR from the stakeholders’ perspective. For instance, Sharfman and 
Fernando (2008) specify that CSR investments reduce the probabilities of expected financial, 
social, or environmental crisis that could adversely influence firm’s cash flows. Godfrey, Merrill, 
and Hansen (2009) point out CSR investments generate moral capital or goodwill which can 
provide ‘‘insurance-like’’ protection to preserve financial performance. Lins et al. (2017) find that 
CSR pays off when level of trust in firms suffers a negative shock in the crisis period. 
 
Recently, company behavior toward the community has received increasing scrutiny by the media. 
CSR engagement could mitigate information asymmetry problems as firms signal their social 
responsibility and attract coverage from news media and financial analysts. The increased 
disclosure coupled with firms’ signal of reputation and responsibility give socially responsible 
firms easier access to capital market and cheaper financing. Specifically, El Ghoul et al. (2011) 
find that firms with better CSR scores exhibit cheaper equity financing. Hsu and Chen (2015) find 
socially responsible firms have better credit ratings and lower credit risk. Goss and Roberts (2011) 
find cheaper bank loans for socially responsible firms. Lastly, Gu, Bosworth, and Wang (2016) 
showed that CSR is more valuable to firms under unfavorable financial market conditions and 
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these firms respond with more CSR engagement.  
 
Based on the above evidences, we argue that firms with higher CSR engagement will have less 
risk of encountering financial difficulty, and better financing opportunities to recover and avoid 
costly financial distress. Therefore, we hypothesize a negative relationship between firms’ CSR 
and likelihood of falling into financial distress:  
 
Hypothesis 1b: ceteris paribus, CSR reduces firms’ probability of falling into financial distress. 
 
Business Cycle and International Involvement 
 
According to shareholder expense view, CSR investments drained precious financial resources 
from firms, thus making them more vulnerable during the economic downturns when external 
credit is harder to obtain, such as the technology bubble burst (2000-2002) and financial crisis of 
2008. During these economic downturns, the liquidity tightening can threaten the viability of 
firms, especially firms that are financially weak because of their CSR engagements. We believe it 
essential to investigate the impact of CSR on firms’ likelihood of financial distress under different 
macroeconomic situations, specifically in the economic downturns (2000-2002, 2008) and 
economic expansion periods (the years immediately preceding the two downturns, namely 1997-
1999, 2007), to provide deeper understanding of the impact of CSR on firms’ financial distress. 
 
While shareholder expense view expects firms with higher CSR have higher likelihood of falling 
into financial distress in the economic downturns than in the expansion period (Pagano & Volpin, 
2005; Cronqvist et al., 2009; Masulis & Reza, 2015), stakeholder view argues for the exact 
opposite (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013, Lins et al., 2017; Bae et al., 2018). For example, Lins et al. 
(2017) reports that high CSR firms earned significantly higher stock returns than low CSR firms 
during the 2008-2009 financial crisis, when the overall economy faced a severe crisis of 
confidence. This is in line with the insurance-based view of CSR (e.g., Fombrun, Gardberg, & 
Barnett, 2000; Godfrey, 2005; Peloza, 2006), which argues that CSR investments build up social 
capital and provide firms not only easier access but also a broader base of resources during 
challenging macroeconomic situations. Therefore, it is expected that in the economic downturn 
periods, CSR firms could take advantage of the resources they built up and are less likely to fall 
into financial distress. 
 
Hypothesis 2: ceteris paribus, the effect of CSR on lowering firms’ probability of falling into 
financial distress is more pronounced in economic downturn period than in expansion period. 
 
In addition, according to stakeholder view, more international involvement of CSR firms is 
associated with an even broader base of available resources provided by stakeholders compared 
to CSR firms with less international involvement (Husted & Allen, 2006; Crilly, 2011). Therefore, 
we further investigate whether the impact of CSR on financial distress is subject to influence by 
firms’ international involvement. Specifically, we explore if the effect of CSR engagement on 
lowering likelihood of financial distress is more pronounced for internationally involved firms. To 
measure international involvement, we consider both firms’ assets and sales that are classified as 
foreign and calculate the involvement ratio of foreign to total assets and total sales. Firms are 
grouped into “high international involvement” and “low or no international involvement” if the 
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ratio is above or below the sample median.  
 
Compared to low international involvement firms, the stakeholders of highly international 
involved firms come from both domestic and foreign markets and are thus subject to different 
systematic risks. When the financial situation worsens in the domestic market, firms with no or 
low foreign involvements may not get much help since domestic stakeholders themselves may 
also experience financial troubles. Firms with higher international involvements, on the other 
hand, benefit from their international stakeholders who are less likely to be affected by the 
domestic trouble. Additionally, from the ease of market financing perspective, international firms 
with CSR engagement are subject to disciplines of multiple capital markets, thus having higher 
levels of information transparency. As a result, these socially responsible firms can obtain easier 
financing from international markets. Based on these arguments, if the stakeholder view and ease 
of financing view of CSR dominate the empirical results, then we should observe: 
 
Hypothesis 3: ceteris paribus, the effect of CSR on lowering firms’ probability of falling into 
financial distress is more pronounced in firms with high international involvement than those with 
low or no international involvement. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
We construct the data by merging Compustat North America (industry affiliation and financial 
data) with MSCI ESG STATS (Corporate social responsibility data) for the time period of 1991-
2015. When testing Hypothesis 3, we also merge MSCI ESG STATS with Compustat Global to 
get the foreign segment data. Following the common practice of empirical study, we exclude 
highly regulated industries: financial institutions (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 
4900-4999). All financial variables are winsorized at the 99
th 
percentile. The final sample consists 
of 11,840 U.S. firm-year observations.  
 
Financial Distress 
 
We follow Atanassov and Kim (2009) and constructed two financial distress variables: distress1 
(=1 if the company has a positive, above-industry median EBITDA/TA in the previous year and 
drops more than 50% in EBITDA in the distress year; =0 otherwise); and distress2 (=1 if the 
company has a positive, above-industry median EBITDA/TA in the previous year and EBITDA 
falls to the bottom quartile of its industry in the distress year; =0 otherwise). 
 
Empirical research also employed other measures in defining financial distress. Besides the 
definition mentioned above, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990) assume a firm is approaching 
distress when the coverage ratio falls below one. Based on Altman (1968), Taffler (1983, 1984) 
develops a popular Z-score model used by banks and industrial firms in the United Kingdom. 
According to Taffler’s model, a firm is in distress if it has a minimum of one year of negative Z 
score after two consecutive years of positive Z scores. We follow Atanassov and Kim’s (2009) 
definition due to several reasons. First, this measure focuses on the financial distress that brings 
negative and costly consequences, especially substantial drop in operating performances. In the 
business world, not all financial distresses are created equal. Wruck (1990) argues that financial 
distress could be beneficial because it provides firms with incentives to change poor governance 
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structure and forces firms to restructure by refocusing on their operations and altering 
organizational strategies. By employing Atanassov and Kim’s (2009) definition, we are able to 
filter out the non-costly (or beneficial) financial distress conditions. Second, unlike Z-score which 
is designed for specific industries, Atanassov and Kim’s (2009) approach applies to all industries 
and is not subject to substantial losses of data (since EBITDA and total asset are widely available). 
Third, distress1 and distress2 are complementary in the sense that distress1 focuses on the 
deteriorating performances within a firm and distress2 incorporates relative performances 
compared to the industry. Based on the above reasoning, Atanassov and Kim’s (2009) definition of 
financial distress fits our research purpose the best because we explore if CSR engagements could 
lower firms’ probability of falling into costly financial distress. 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Following mainstream studies on this subject, we use MSCI ESG STATS database to measure 
CSR. The dataset is tracked by an independent firm specializing in researching and consulting 
firms’ CSR activities. The sources of CSR activity ratings in MSCI ESG STATS come from 
government agencies, non-governmental organizations, global media publications, annual reports, 
regulatory filings, proxy statements and company disclosures. The coverage of the database has 
expanded over time. For the early period before the year 2000, MSCI ESG STATS covers S&P 
500 and the Domini Social Index. After 2000, more firm samples from other indexes are included 
in the database, including the Russell 2000 Index and the Broad Market Social Index. The broad 
dataset allows us to take the longitudinal approach to explore the constant efforts of firms’ CSR.  
 
There are two main categories built in MSCI ESG STATS: qualitative issue areas and 
controversial business issues. Qualitative issue areas cover community, diversity, employment, 
environment, human rights, product and corporate governance. Controversial businesses include 
alcohol, gaming, firearms, military, nuclear and tobacco. Within each area, a number of concerns 
and strengths are addressed (each concern or strength is assigned 0 or 1). The variable of interest 
employed in this study (CSR) compiles the netting numbers of strengths and concerns in 
qualitative issue areas. The same dataset and variable measurement have been employed in most 
of the empirical studies on corporate social responsibilities, such as in Lins et al. (2017) and Bae 
et al. (2018).  
 
Control Variables 
 
Prior studies have explored possible factors that contribute to financial distress and these factors 
are controlled for in our empirical study. According to the coverage shortfall criterion, three broad 
reasons can lead to financial distress: industry downturn, high interest payment and poor firm 
performance (Asquith, Gertner, & Scharfstein, 1994). Andrade and Kaplan (1998) bring forward 
four factors: Industry performance, firm leverage, short-term interest rate changes, and firm 
performance. Accordingly, control variables employed in our study incorporate characteristics of 
firm level (firm leverage, R&D ratio, sales growth, firm size, firm age), industry level (industry 
performance) and macroeconomic level (libor volatility, libor change) factors.  
 
In this study, firm leverage is measured as total debt divided by total assets. In addition, we 
consider R&D plus advertising expenses (R&D ratio) as another important factor because higher 
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intangible assets represent less collateral available to the firm, which contribute to financial 
distress. Sales growth reflects firm’s sales growth from the previous year. Firm size and firm age 
are controlled for because firms with larger size could enjoy stronger coinsurance benefits and 
older surviving firms have more experience to cope with financial distress, both of which lower 
financial distress risks. Industry performance is estimated using mean industry ratio of EBITDA 
over sales. Interest rate change is measured by both standard deviation of 3-month London 
Interbank Offered Rate (libor volatility) and year end change of 3-month Libor rate (libor change). 
 
Empirical Model 
 
Based on the feature of dependent variable (financial distress), we employ the following Probit 
model to test whether CSR engagement increases or decreases a firm’s likelihood of falling into 
financial distress after controlling all the well-documented factors that contribute to the distress: 
 
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠1 (𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠2)𝑖,𝑡
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑅&𝐷 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
In the model, i indexes firm and t indexes year. In all specifications, we control for the industry 
and year fixed effects. All control variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate 
the influence of outliers. Reported standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent and allow for 
clustering at the firm level.  
 
FINDINGS 
 
Summary Statistics 
 
Table 1 presents the sample distribution by the two-digit SIC code industry. As the table shows, 
the most heavily represented industry division is manufacturing (53.46%, SIC code: 20-39), 
followed by services division (18.12%, SIC code: 70-89). Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics 
of variables, including subsamples of high CSR firms (firms with positive net scores of CSR 
ratings) and low CSR firms (firms with zero or negative net scores of CSR ratings). The mean 
differences in distress between high CSR and low CSR groups are statistically significant, 
suggesting that high CSR firms are less likely to fall into financial distress than low CSR firms. 
We find no significant difference in firm leverage between the two groups. Other than that, high 
CSR firms show distinct firm-level and industry-level characteristics from low CSR firms. In 
general, we observe that high CSR firms invest less in R&D and advertising; have slower sales 
growth; are associated with worse performing industries; and are larger and more mature in age. 
 
As suggested by the pairwise correlations of variables (not reported due to space limit), both 
distress variables (distress1 and distress2) are negatively correlated with CSR variable. This result 
also provides preliminary support for hypothesis 1b, which predicts that high CSR firms are 
associated with lower likelihood of financial distress. 
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Table 1. Sample Distribution by Industry 
Industry Two Digit SIC Freq. Percent% Cum% 
Division A. - Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing  (01-09) 48 0.4 0.97 
Division B. - Mining  (10-14) 630 5.33 5.73 
Division C. - Construction  (15-17) 195 1.65 7.37 
Division D. - Manufacturing  (20-39) 6273 53.02 60.35 
Division E. - Transportation & Pub. Utilities  (40-49) 825 6.98 67.32 
Division F. - Wholesale Trade  (50-51) 441 3.72 71.05 
Division G. - Retail Trade  (52-59) 1125 9.51 80.55 
Division I. - Services  (70-89) 2260 19.09 99.64 
Division K. – Non-classifiable Establishments  99 43 0.36 100 
Total   11840 100   
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics, CSR vs. Non-CSR Firms 
Variable Full Sample CSR Firms Non-CSR Firms P-
value 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median t-test 
Distress1 11840 0.06 0.00 3934 0.05 0.00 7906 0.06 0.00 0.00 
Distress2 11840 0.13 0.00 3934 0.11 0.00 7906 0.14 0.00 0.00 
CSR 11840 0.18 0.00 3934 2.81 2.00 7906 -1.13 -1.00 0.00 
Firm leverage 11840 0.50 0.49 3934 0.52 0.51 7906 0.49 0.48 0.00 
R&D ratio 11840 0.07 0.02 3934 0.08 0.04 7906 0.06 0.01 0.00 
Sales growth 11840 0.09 0.08 3934 0.08 0.07 7906 0.10 0.08 0.00 
Firm size (raw) 11840 10175.33 1813.19 3934 19570.61 4842.38 7906 5500.27 1307.91 0.00 
Firm age (raw) 11840 25.87 20.00 3934 29.80 24.00 7906 23.91 19.00 0.00 
Industry 
performance 
11840 0.01 0.12 3934 -0.02 0.12 7906 0.02 0.12 0.00 
Libor volatility 11840 0.28 0.17 3934 0.28 0.19 7906 0.28 0.17 0.00 
Libor change 11840 -0.18 0.00 3934 -0.23 -0.07 7906 -0.16 0.00 0.00 
 
Impact of CSR on Financial Distress 
 
Our main results on the empirical relationship between CSR and financial distress are reported in 
Table 3. Models 1 and 2 report the Probit regression results and highlight the impact of CSR on 
two financial distress variables (distress1 and distress2). We find that both models show negative 
correlations between CSR and probability of financial distress, and Model 2 is significant at 1% 
level. The multivariable model results are consistent with hypothesis 1b, which indicates that CSR 
investments could mitigate financial distress risks when all the other factors are controlled for. 
Thus, out of the two competing hypotheses 1a and 1b, hypothesis 1b is supported by our data 
analysis. Specifically, our results support the stakeholder view and suggest CSR reduce firms’ 
probability of financial distress. 
 
Although CSR engagements cost firms’ financial resources, such activities build up relationships 
with firms’ stakeholders and lower the likelihood of financial distress. This reward from doing 
good to society is especially important to firms with higher financial distress risk. Our finding is 
consistent with Gu et al. (2016) and Lins et al. (2017). Our findings provide practical implications 
to firms that have higher tendency to fall into financial distress. For example, firms that are subject 
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to economic volatility (tourism industry), firms that maintain high level of debt are shown to be 
more likely to be financially distressed. For these firms, engaging in corporate social activities 
could potentially guard themselves from financial venerability. In contrast, for firms that are less 
subject to financial distress and at the same time are highly involved in corporate social activities, 
their supervisors should watch the potential “channeling resource” behaviors. 
 
Robustness Tests 
 
To address the potential issue in regression tests, we further examine whether the relationship 
between CSR and financial distress is driven by endogeneity problems as follows. First, reverse 
causality could occur because firms which are less likely to fall into financial distress are often 
those who have sufficient capital to invest in CSR activities in the first place. Second, CSR 
investments and financial distress could both be driven by unobserved firm-specific factors. For 
example, managers who are interested in undertaking CSR investments are risk takers (since CSR 
is not considered regular invested items in most firms). These managers are also more likely to 
take risky investment programs which could lead to financial distress. To resolve these potential 
problems, we employ industry median CSR score and year median CSR score as instrumental 
variables. We predict that these two instrumental variables have a positive impact on CSR because 
a firm tends to imitate industry peers’ CSR practices. In addition, CSR practices tend to be sticky. 
These two instruments are closely correlated with the firm-specific CSR but are unlikely to impact 
the firm distress probability. Models 3 and 4 of Table 3 show the regression results of Instrumental 
Variable Probit (ivprobit) models. The main finding is shown to be even more pronounced. CSR 
score is negatively associated with financial distress proxies at 1% level. The results lend further 
support to Hypothesis 1b and show that the effect of CSR on reducing likelihood of financial 
distress survived the endogeneity test. 
 
We also conduct several other robustness tests (not reported due to space limit). One is lagging 
financial distress variable one year to test the effect of current year CSR to the financial distress 
of next year. By doing this, we address the concern of current year accounting data reported in 
early or middle of the next year. The empirical results are qualitatively similar when using the 
lagging data. Second, we also experiment with new CSR variables based on ASSET4 ESG 
(Environmental, Social, and Governance) dataset. ASSET4 is a Thomson Reuters business which 
collects corporate social responsibility data. The database provides fewer observations than MSCI 
ESG STATS. Therefore, we use it for the robustness test instead of main study. The empirical test 
results are consistent with what is shown in Table 3. Overall, our main finding of CSR engagement 
reducing a firm’s likelihood of falling into costly financial distress is robust and not affected by 
endogeneity, accounting report delay, or alternatively measurements of CSR. The results lend 
further support to the stakeholder view of CSR and supports the benefits provided by CSR to firms 
that tend to be financially distressed. 
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Table 3. Probit Model of Financial Distress and CSR 
This table reports the Probit regression results regarding the impact of CSR on financial distress. The 
dependent variables are distress1 and distress2. The independent variables are listed in the table. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Probit Model Probit Model with Instruments 
Variables distress1 distress2 distress1 distress2 
          
CSR -0.0150 -0.0375*** -0.1298*** -0.0922*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0079) (0.0372) (0.0223) 
firm leverage -0.1538* 0.3081*** -0.1593* 0.2864*** 
 (0.0906) (0.0613) (0.0893) (0.0610) 
R&D ratio 2.9578*** 0.3074*** 2.9800*** 0.3333*** 
 (0.3018) (0.0766) (0.2927) (0.0774) 
sales growth -4.2199*** -0.5773*** -4.0961*** -0.6444*** 
 (0.3080) (0.1184) (0.3146) (0.1187) 
firm size -0.2209*** -0.2075*** -0.1520*** -0.1671*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0124) (0.0313) (0.0178) 
firm age -0.0546 0.1487*** -0.0390 0.1543*** 
 (0.0415) (0.0261) (0.0409) (0.0259) 
industry performance -0.2386*** 0.6572*** -0.2509*** 0.6413*** 
 (0.0522) (0.0671) (0.0510) (0.0679) 
libor volatility -6.0483 10.6814*** -4.0694 -4.4501* 
 (5.6050) (3.2884) (3.8919) (2.4957) 
libor change 0.9266 1.6074** 0.6992 1.4023* 
 (1.1471) (0.6681) (1.0631) (0.7487) 
Constant 0.0874 -0.3971*** -0.4011 -0.4856*** 
 (0.2165) (0.1342) (0.2594) (0.1532) 
     
Observations 11,840 11,840 11,840 11,840 
 
Impact of CSR on Financial Distress in Business Cycle 
 
In different macroeconomic environments, CSR’s impact on firms’ financial distress may vary. Table 
4 presents the impact of CSR on financial distress in economic downturns and expansion periods. 
The economic downturn periods are defined as technology bubble burst period (2000-2002) and 
financial crisis (2008). The expansion periods refer to the years immediately preceding the two 
bust periods (1997-1999, 2007). As discussed in section 2, stakeholders tend to provide various 
supports in the economic downturns for CSR firms, while the need for such help is not as urgent 
in economic expansion periods. Therefore, we would expect a more pronounced impact during 
the downturn periods. The results shown in Table 4 are consistent with our prediction. Models 1 
and 2 suggest that high CSR firms experience less likelihood of falling into costly financial distress 
during the downturn periods. On the contrary, CSR does not help much to reduce financial distress 
in expansion periods since the coefficients are insignificant in models 3 and 4. Hence, our 
regression results support Hypothesis 2, which states that the effect of CSR on lowering firms’ 
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probability of falling into financial distress is more pronounced in economic downturn period than 
in expansion period. 
 
Table 4. Probit Model of Financial Distress and CSR: Economic Downturns vs. Expansions 
This table reports the Probit regression results regarding the impact of CSR on financial distress in 
economic downturns and expansions. The dependent variables are distress1 and distress2. The 
independent variables are listed in the table. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Downturns Expansions 
Variables distress1 distress2 distress1 distress2 
          
CSR -0.4014*** -0.2927*** -0.2269 -0.0088 
 (0.1017) (0.0610) (0.2144) (0.0683) 
firm leverage 0.0609 0.2383 0.7012 0.5850** 
 (0.3396) (0.2300) (0.8513) (0.2798) 
R&D ratio 2.4171** 3.2275*** -6.4892 1.1931 
 (0.9849) (0.6254) (9.5128) (0.9509) 
sales growth -2.8333*** -1.8573*** -4.4639*** -0.5169* 
 (0.4505) (0.2758) (1.0584) (0.2864) 
firm size -0.1157* -0.1036*** -0.2132 -0.1519*** 
 (0.0638) (0.0373) (0.1550) (0.0481) 
firm age -0.2722* 0.0018 -0.0666 0.0767 
 (0.1439) (0.0837) (0.2860) (0.1014) 
industry performance 0.0728 0.7401** 0.5185 1.0112*** 
 (0.4635) (0.3047) (1.0245) (0.3825) 
libor volatility 0.2748 2.3204*** 16.2162 1.8852*** 
 (0.7863) (0.4056) (10.3375) (0.4987) 
libor change 0.0038 0.5413***   
 (0.1555) (0.0821)   
Constant -0.8692 -1.0009*** -4.3415* -1.4090*** 
 (0.6230) (0.3548) (2.2665) (0.4530) 
     
Observations 1,709 1,709 1,313 1,313 
 
Impact of International Involvement on CSR and Financial Distress 
 
Business involvement in foreign countries not only helps CSR firms to obtain a broader base of 
stakeholder resources but also gives firms access to international capital markets since they are 
subject to international supervisions. Consequently, with the same CSR engagements, firms with 
higher international involvement will be less likely to fall into costly financial distress, as 
discussed in Hypothesis 3. Table 5 presents how the impact of CSR on financial distress varies 
with the level of international involvement. We reported the regression results for firms with high 
international involvement and low or no international involvement according to their proportion 
of sales that comes from foreign segments. High (low or no) international involvement refers to 
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firms with ratio above (below) the median of the entire sample. As shown in the table, Models 1 
and 2 suggest that highly international involved firms with CSR efforts exhibit a strong ability to 
avoid financial distress. However, there are no significant relationships shown in CSR firms with 
low or no international involvement as reported in Models 3 and 4. Regression results using 
foreign assets to separate high vs. low or no international involvement subsamples are similar but 
not reported due to space limit. The empirical evidences support Hypothesis 3. This part of the 
analysis supports the importance of incorporating contextual differences of firms (such as 
international involvement) into consideration when examining the impact of CSR on firms’ 
chances of falling into financial distress. 
 
Table 5. Probit Model of Financial Distress and CSR: International Involvement 
This table reports the Probit regression results regarding the impact of CSR on financial distress for 
firms with high level of international involvement and firms with low or no involvement. The dependent 
variables are distress1 and distress2. The independent variables are listed in the table. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 High Involvement Low or No Involvement 
Variables distress1 distress2 distress1 distress2 
          
CSR -0.1069*** -0.0491*** 0.0734 -0.0144 
 (0.0287) (0.0157) (0.0802) (0.0294) 
firm leverage 0.2865 0.0999 0.4011 0.2063 
 (0.1858) (0.1221) (0.3952) (0.1727) 
R&D ratio 1.2751** 1.1669*** 3.1267*** 2.0954*** 
 (0.5935) (0.3860) (0.8486) (0.5005) 
sales growth -3.4179*** -0.9064*** -4.5583*** -2.8063*** 
 (0.5217) (0.2519) (0.6538) (0.3397) 
firm size -0.0853* -0.1952*** -0.6555*** -0.2150*** 
 (0.0469) (0.0247) (0.1512) (0.0449) 
firm age -0.3016*** -0.0632 -0.2544 -0.0087 
 (0.0766) (0.0518) (0.1859) (0.0721) 
industry performance 0.2372 2.0126*** -2.1328 3.2083*** 
 (0.8443) (0.3923) (1.6026) (0.7527) 
libor volatility -7.4725** -0.5913 0.5366 -6.4068** 
 (3.1303) (2.1368) (7.7669) (2.9464) 
libor change -1.3426*** -0.0814 -0.3064 -1.0288** 
 (0.4786) (0.3417) (1.0938) (0.4704) 
Constant -0.2681 -0.3011 0.7514 -0.0113 
 (0.5941) (0.3668) (1.6153) (0.5537) 
     
Observations 3,816 4,226 2,252 2,607 
 
Overall, these results provide further managerial implications to firms with high probability of 
falling into financial distress. If a firm is exposed to economies that constantly experience crises, 
this firm may get more protection by engaging in corporate social activities. In addition, our 
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findings lend further support to the perspective of international diversification. Specifically, 
multinational corporations with better landscape of diversification might be less affected by 
financial distress. In another word, firms with businesses mainly operated in single economies 
could be better protected by engaging in socially responsible activities.  
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
In this article, we explore whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagement affects firm’s 
chances of falling into costly financial distress. Because of the potential impacts by 
macroeconomic, industry, and firm characteristics on firm performance, we tackled this question 
by assessing firms’ CSR efforts over a long period of time and incorporated multi-level factors 
into consideration.  
 
Our empirical tests reveal that CSR engagements reduce the likelihood of firms falling into 
financial distress, and the effects are more pronounced during economic downturn periods and for 
firms with high levels of international involvement. These results suggest that CSR plays an 
important role for firms to lower the chance of falling into financial distress. Our results are 
statistically robust by adjusting for potential reverse causality and omitted variable issues. In 
addition, by adopting observations from 1991 to 2015, we observe firms’ behavior over different 
economic periods, including both downturn and expansion periods, thus providing a longitudinal 
view of how CSR matters to firms’ financial distress. To our knowledge, no other study has used 
a longitudinal approach to examine the impact of CSR on firms’ financial distress. Our research 
sheds light on the challenge proposed by Godfrey et al. (2009) about how CSR activities play a 
role in an economy-wide crisis. Furthermore, our research incorporates firms’ level of 
international involvement into consideration to provide a meaningful refinement of the existing 
approach. Our results are supportive of the stakeholder view of CSR.  
 
Our results add value to practitioners by looking at specific strategic tactics firms can explore to 
enhance shareholder value and to cope with adverse and unpredictable disturbances. Business 
entities always try to balance between “doing good” and “doing well” since most of the time the 
two won’t be achieved at the same time. CSR engagement activities do drain corporate resources, 
but they also build social capitals for firms (Lins et al. 2017) and provide a safety net in 
unfavorable financial market conditions (Godfrey et al. 2009). Therefore, business entities should 
maintain CSR engagement, at least within their financial capability, for long-term oriented 
strategy. These engagement activities are especially important for firms with lower financial 
stability, in controversial business, and/or facing public and media scrutiny.  
 
Our findings also suggest the importance of taking a longitudinal approach and taking firm-unique 
resources and capabilities into consideration when examining the impact of CSR on firm financial 
distress. With data permission, observing a single firm’s decades of CSR activities and financial 
performance and risk would be interesting. Also, pairwise comparison of firms with similar 
financial backgrounds but opposite approaches for CSR will reveal strong evidence for CSR’s 
effects on firm performance. We believe future research can broaden literatures and theories in 
this field. 
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